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Abstract
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Respon-
sibility) to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of three-tier supply chain
in decentralized state that is including supplier, manufacturer and retailer. For analyzing
supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members
of supply chain, we use Stackelberg game and we consider in this paper a hierarchical equi-
librium solution for a two-level game. Specially, we formulate a model that crosses through
multi-periods by a dynamic discreet Stackelberg game. We try to obtain an equilibrium
point at where both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken by supply chains are
maximized.
Keywords: Supply chain, CSR, Game theory, Dynamic game, Stackelberg game.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a growing number of large, medium, and even small- sized companies have in-
creasingly focused on CSR. They have realized the need to develop strategies that extend their
traditional corporate governance processes beyond firm boundaries to their supply chain partners
[7]. This is chiefly because, along with increasing consumer information about the conditions of
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manufacture, they criticize supply chains for several social responsibilities. Moreover, the firms in
supply chain have been pressured by a regulations and policies related to CSR from governments
and organizations. The members of supply chain make their decisions based on maximizing of
their individual net benefits. Also, when they have to take a level of CSR; this situation leads to
an equilibrium status. Game theory is one of the most effective tools to deal with such a kind of
management problems.
A growing number of research papers, use game theoretical applications in supply chain manage-
ment. Cachon et al. [3] discuss Nash equilibrium in a noncooperative cases in a supply chain where
there are one supplier and multiple retailers. Hennet et al. [6] presented a paper to evaluate the
efficiency of different types of contracts between the industrial partners of a supply chain. They
applied game theory method for decisional purposes.
Tian et al. [12] presented a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory for green
supply chain management as well.
In this paper, we formulate a model for decentralized supply chain network in CSR conditions in
a long term with one leader and two followers. The Stackelberg game model is recommended and
applied here to find an equilibrium point in which we maximize the profit of members of supply
chain and the level of CSR taken by the supply chain. In this research, the supplier as a leader, can
know the optimal reaction of his followers, and regards such processes to maximize his own profit.
The manufacturer and the retailer as followers, try to maximize their profits by considering all
conditions. We propose a Hamiltonian matrix to solve the optimal control problem to obtain the
equilibrium in this game. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to General model.
Objective functions, constraints and solving the game are illustrated in Section 3. A Conclusion
is provided in Section 4.
2 The general model
We consider a Stackelberg differential game involving two players playing the game over a fixed
finite horizon model suggested by He et al. [5]. We consider a dynamic game that goes through
multi-periods as a repeated game with complete information. This model is a three-tier, multi-
period, decentralized supply chain network. We assume that only one supplier, one manufacturer
and one retailer are involved in playing the Stackelberg game as well as allocated social responsi-
bility. A long term Stackelberg game is played between the members of the decentralized supply
chain through two levels in which all members take CSR into consideration. We formulate the
model by selecting the supplier as the leader and both of the manufacturer and retailer as the
follower in Stackelberg game. This model can be solved by considering two levels of Stackelberg
game. In first level the manufacturer as the leader and retailer as the follower are considered.
In this level, we find equilibrium point and in the second level, we consider the supplier as the
leader and the manufacturer as the follower. In fact, we put response functions of followers in the
objective function of the leader and we find the final equilibrium point and all of the players make
decisions.
As any problem formulated as a dynamic game, this model has a state variable and control vari-
ables. We define the state variable as the level of social responsibility taken by companies, and
the control variables are the capital amounts invested in taking social responsibility. Specifically,
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all of the social responsibility taken by firm j at period t can be expressed as investment Ijt . The
level of current supply chain investment in supply responsibility is xt; therefore the accumulation
of level of social responsibility taken by the firms is given by xt+1 = αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t .
Here, β1 is the rate of converting the supplier’s capital investment in CSR to the amount of CSR
taken by the supply chain; β2 is the rate of converting the manufacturer’s capital investment in
CSR to the amount of CSR taken by the supply chain and β3 is the rate of converting the retailer’s
capital investment in CSR to the amount of CSR taken by the supply chain [11].
For the purpose of the paper, we more specifically assume: function Bt(xt) = δxt, that represents
a social benefit to the firms, where the coefficient δ is supposed to be strictly positive [1].
The following functions T St = τI
S
t
[
1 + θ(ISt + I
M
t + I
R
t )
]
, TMt = τI
M
t
[
1 + θ(ISt + I
M
t + I
R
t )
]
measure the amount of money given by the to the supplier and the manufacturer [4]. For retailer
TRt = τI
R
t
[
1 + θ(ISt + I
M
t + I
R
t )
]
both τ and θ are tax return policy parameters. Specifically, τ is
the rate of individual post tax return on investment (ROI), and θ is rate of supply chain’s post
tax return on investment (ROI).
All kinds of social responsibilities are assumed to be expressed as investment It.
The market inverse demand is PM(qt) = a− bqt [8].
3 Objective function and constraints
Let the time interval be [1,T]. The objective function of the supplier is
JS = argmax
T∑
t=1
P St qt − cqt +B
S
t (xt) + T
S
t (I
S
t , It)− I
S
t + dI
M
t
= argmax
T∑
t=1
vqt − cqt + δx
2
t + τI
S
t [1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t )]− I
S
t + dI
M
t ,
subject to xt+1 = αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t , where the coefficients β are positive and with β < 1.
P St is the price of the supplier’s raw material. Let P
S
t = v. B
S
t (xt) is the social benefit of the
supplier, δ is the parameter of the supplier’s social benefit and T St (I
S
t , It) is the tax return of the
supplier. d is the percentage of investment of the supplier payoff. Similarly, the objective function
of the manufacturer is
JM = argmax
T∑
t=1
PMt (qt)qt − P
S
t qt +B
M(xt) + T
M(IMt , It)− I
M
t + d̂I
R
t
= argmax
T∑
t=1
(a− bqt)qt − vqt + δ̂x
2
t + τI
M
t (1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t ))− I
M
t + d̂I
R
t ,
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where PMt (qt) is the retail price of the product of the manufacturer. B
M
t (xt) is the social benefit
of the manufacturer, δ̂ is the parameter of the manufacturer’s social benefit. TMt (I
M
t , It) is the tax
return of the manufacturer. d̂ is the percentage of investment of the manufacturer payoff.
The objective function of the retailer is
JR = argmax
T∑
t=1
PRt qt − P
M
t (qt)qt +B
R(xt) + T
R(IRt , It)− I
R
t
= argmax
T∑
t=1
zqt − (a− bqt)qt +
̂̂
δx2t + τI
R
t (1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t ))− I
R
t ,
where PRt is the price of the product the retailer sells to the consumer. Let P
R
t = Z. B
R
t (xt) is
the social benefit of the retailer,
̂̂
δ is the parameter of the retailer’s social benefit. TRt (I
R
t , It) is
the tax return of the retailer.
3.1 Mathematical model
We solve the mathematical model with two levels, in the first level the manufacturer’s optimal
function is calculated by reaction function of retailer and the second level, the game is between the
supplier as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower. In fact, the reaction functions of two
followers (retailer and manufacturer) are placed on the objective function of the leader (supplier),
we can find final equilibrium point.
In the level one, we establish a Stackelberg game between manufacturer as the leader and retailer as
the follower. In this level, to calculate the equilibrium first we calculate the best reaction function
of retailer, then we determine the manufacturer’s optimal decisions based on the retailer’ best
reactions. Since we consider this dynamic game as an optimal control problem, the Hamiltonian
function is a practical way to find the equilibrium of the game [10]. The manufacturer’s optimal
decisions based on the retailer’ best reactions is determined. To obtain the Stackelberg strategy
of the manufacturer, we maximize the objective function of the manufacturer by its Hamiltonian
function.
We define the firms Hamiltonian as below. For fixed IMt the Hamiltonian function of the retailer
is defined by
HRt = J
R
t + P
R
t+1(xt+1).
By using the conditions for a maximization of this Hamiltonian, we get after some algebras: IRt ,
xt+1 and P
R
t+1.
Now, the manufacturer is faced with the optimal control problem. To obtain the Stackelberg
strategy of the manufacturer, we maximize the objective function of the manufacturer by its
Hamiltonian function. We fix the value of IRt , then get the Hamiltonian function of the manufac-
turer
HMt = J
M
t + P
M
t+1(xt+1) + ut(P
R
t ).
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So, we obtain, IMt , xt+1, P
M
t and ut+1.
In this level, the game is between supplier as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower. In
fact, the reaction functions of two followers (retailer and manufacturer) are placed on the objective
function of the leader (supplier). We can find final equilibrium point.
For fixed IMt Hamiltonian function of the supplier is defined by
HSt = J
S
t + P
S
t+1(xt+1) + u
′
t(P
M
t ).
We place reaction functions of followers into the leaders Hamiltonian function and we obtain
ISt , P
S
t+1, u
′
t(P
M
t ) and xt+1.
For solving the above optimal control problem, we chose an algorithms given by Medanic and
Radojevic which is an augmented discrete Hamiltonian matrix [9].
First, we assume[
x˜t+1
P˜t
]
=
[
A B
C D
] [
x˜t
P˜t+1
]
+
[
D
E
]
=
[
Ax˜t +BP˜t+1 +D
Cx˜t + AP˜t+1 + E
]
,
where x˜t+1 =
[
xt+1
ut+1
]
and P˜t+1 =
[
pMt+1
pRt+1
]
,
A,B, and C are 2× 2 matrices, and D and C are 2× 1 matrices.
We solved the above problem by sweep method [2], by assuming a linear relation between p˜t and
x˜t; thus, we can compute the value of p˜t and x˜t and we can obtain the values of the other variables
for all points in time by backward and forward loop.
4 Conclusion
This paper investigated a decentralized three-tier supply chain consisting of supplier, manufacturer
and retailer for the allocating CSR to members of supply chain system in over time. We considered
a two-level Stackelberg game consisting of two followers and one leader. The members of a supply
chain play games with each other to maximize their own profits; thus, the model used to be a long-
term co-investment game model. The equilibrium point at which members make their decisions to
maximize profits by implementing CSR among members of the supply chain in a time horizon was
determined. We applied control theory and used an algorithm (augmented discrete Hamiltonian
matrix) to obtain an optimal solution for the dynamic game model.
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